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Book Reviews
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER,
HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING. By Mark Silverstein.~ Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1984. Pp. 234. $24.95.
Philip B. Kur!and2

Felix Frankfurter once remarked, "Chief Justices of the
United States are rarer than Presidents. A Chief Justice cannot
escape history."3 Since this observation appeared in an encomium
to Harlan Fiske Stone, its sentiment may have been more appropriate than its substance is true. The fact is that chief justices'
names-John Marshall's excepted, of course-go down in history
more as labels for the Courts over which they presided than because of the personal contributions they may have made to constitutional jurisprudence. Except for Marshall, none of the fifteen
chief justices was the dominant figure on the Court over which he
presided. (Strong as he was, Charles Evans Hughes was not the
leader of the Court of his period.) It must be remembered that the
"authors" of Supreme Court opinions purport to express the views
of the majority, not merely their own. The style of an opinion is
idiosyncratic, but its substance is syncretic.
If, however, the judgment of history is to be found in the burgeoning literary genre of judicial biography, it may be that chief
justices dominate. Like most biographies, judicial biographies
tend to be paeans to their subjects. They exalt their protagonists'
virtues, ignore their failings, and exaggerate their influence. Disinterestedness is as rare among biographers of judges as it is now
rare in the work of the jurists themselves.
The subjects of this book, Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter,
possessed much stronger intellects than either Fred Vinson or Earl
Warren, and were certainly the peers of Hughes and Stone. If it
cannot be said that they controlled the decisions of their Courts, it
I.
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can be said with little doubt that they were largely responsible for
the framing of the issues that their Courts addressed.
It has been wisely said that:
The qualities that make for greatness in judges are elusive and the subject of
debate. One thing that is certain is that there is no strong correlation between
judicial eminence and the ability to win support from colleagues on the bench; on
the contrary, many of the ablest and most renowned judges are frequent dissenters. Usually the great judge's impact on law is a long-range one because he is an
innovator challenging the legal status quo.4

There is, however, one consistent if not sufficient condition for entry into the judicial hall of fame and that is longevity of service.
Both Black and Frankfurter were among the long-tenured justices
of the high court.
There is judicial biography in this volume, but there are no
signs of hagiography. The first half of the book is devoted to two
essays describing the pre-judicial lives, first of Frankfurter and
then of Black. Remarkably for this day, the author eschews the
pseudoscientific psychoanalytic approaches that have so recently
flooded the literature, although he is careful not to denigrate such
an approach.s Equally rare is Silverstein's avoidance of the gossip
and sensationalism ofpseudoscholars who would rather be Woodward and Armstrong than academics. Intellectual analysis rather
than ideological commitmevt marks the work and makes it interesting and informative. The book is not summertime hammock
reading to titillate the uninformed. It is a serious work for serious
students. This does not mean that it is a pedant's product. If it
still bears some of the stigmata of a doctoral dissertation, it remains remarkably good reading that is not dependent on the
scholarly paraphernalia for its cogency.
The essential question addressed is how the democratic faiths
of the two justices were tested in the creation and application of
constitutional values in the course of adjudication. Both justices
were deeply committed to a faith in democracy, but they were
members, so to speak, of different sects of that faith. Of Frankfurter, Silverstein perceptively tells us:
Thus by the eve of his appointment to the Court, Frankfurter had a clearly
established, idealized political picture of American democracy. Firm in his belief
that politics was a continual process of education, he refused to justify the state as
merely a referee presiding over the clash of partisan interests and groups, rather,
it was a harmonious machine, powered by a faith in education and the public
interest, slowly progressing toward co=only held goals. At the very center of
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his democratic faith was a confidence in the average citizen's ability, given the
right leadership, to forsake individual interests and to sanction, through the democratic process, action in furtherance of the public interest. 6

If Frankfurter's political experiences can be said to have been
at the general staff level as confidant of governors and cabinet officers and even presidents, Hugo Black's were clearly on the line:
at the hustings, within the Democratic party in Alabama, and later
in the United States Senate. If political party was irrelevant to
Frankfurter's conception of democratic reform, for Black only the
Democrats were the vehicle to this end. In Silverstein's words:
To develop from that Jeffersonian tradition a theory of the use of power to combat private power was the dilemma common to American reformers at the tum of
the twentieth century . . . .
Before his appointment to the Coun, Black, unlike Frankfurter, never developed a coherent theory to justify the use of public power as a means of reform. . . . Confined by a political understanding that would not permit a third
party movement, Black's reform instincts were limited by the realities of the
Democratic party.
Although Black increasingly viewed Congress as the means by which political power could be employed on behalf of the many, he had a consistent distrust
of the use of power that Frankfurter lacked. Frankfurter fashioned a political
theory that appeared to satisfy his democratic faith and realities of the political
world. Although Black had a clearly developed understanding of the polity,
before his appointment to the Court he was unable to formulate a coherent political theory based upon that political vision. Black's ideal state-strong enough to
control private concentrations of power but not strong enough to destroy personal
freedom-reflects his ambiguity about power. Ultimately Black feared both private power and the growth of public power. It was the continuing, unresolved
ambiguity concerning private and public power that was to mark his initial years
on the bench. 7

Of course, these synopses are oversimplifications. Both justices were sophisticated. They were prepared to grant more leeway to conglomerates of labor than to conglomerates of capital.
Black was more truly the Jeffersonian in his respect for federalism
than was Frankfurter and so, too, was he more dubious about concentration of power in the executive. The legislature was, for him,
the democratic branch of government, and in democracy was to
be found our salvation.
The two democratic faiths were to be tested again and again
in the work of the Court. To reconcile judicial review with democratic principles required constant adjustments of beliefs: judicial
review is not reconcilable with democratic concepts of self-government. Judicial review is a restraint on democracy, imposed by
a politically irresponsible judiciary, unelected, irremovable, and
6.
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independent because otherwise the restraints of the Constitution
could become meaningless.
The second part of the book is devoted to measuring Black's
and Frankfurter's democratic faiths as they were displayed in
some of the important areas of constitutional law during their
joint tenure. The comparative technique proves a fruitful one. It
has been essayed once before with the same principals and pretty
much the same issues in Professor Wallace Mendelson's 1961
book Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict on the Court. But
the objective there was different. Mendelson sought to show that
Frankfurter was right and Black was wrong. Silverstein attempts
no such Jovian perspective. He credits the good faith of both jurists and tries to reveal how each justice's principles led him to his
results. He does not expect, nor does he find, the kind of consistency that a true ideology would have dictated. But neither of the
subjects was a rigid ideologue in the European sense. And Silverstein perceives what so many political scientists do not: "Despite
frequent scholarly attempts to study judges in a manner similar to
the study of other political actors, judges are different and studies
of judicial behavior must account for their differences."s
Black and Frankfurter were antagonists, but they respected
each other and respected the limitations of their office. Thus, they
were joined in a way that separated them from a justice like William 0. Douglas. In voting behavior, Douglas and Black were
often allied against Frankfurter. But Douglas did not share
Black's notion of the limited nature of the judicial power and he
frequently questioned the good faith of those with whom he
disagreed.
Silverstein's conclusion is worth quotation:
The American judicial tradition is marked by ambiguity. Principally this is the
case because we are a nation that is at once liberal and democratic, and we expect
judges to be faithful to both traditions. It is, perhaps, an unrealistic expectation,
and thus it is hardly surprising that after two hundred years the judiciary is still a
subject of intense controversy and debate. In the final analysis, the judicial role
remains ambiguous for judge and citizen alike.
Frankfurter and Black are symbolic of that tradition. Fearful of judicial tyranny, each sought in highly developed role orientations with roots deep in American political and social thought the means to ensure disinterested decision
making. Each continually sought to harmonize judicial review with its democratic setting, and each strove to remove from the judicial process the vagaries of
personal preference. Each ultimately was guided in his task by a single-minded
devotion to the Constitution and the ideal of the rule oflaw.9
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This book is different from most judicial studies that we have
been getting. You don't have to accept the author's conclusions.
But certainly he has adduced strong evidence in support of them.
And if you are tired of tirades, glutted with gossip, sick of sycophancy, here is some plain talk by an author who seems to know
what he is talking about.

Although Black was often remiss in adhering to his "strict" readings of the due process and
equal protection clauses, Frankfurter's willingness to treat them as open-ended incorporations of the sounder values of our civilization brought with it an enormous authority for the
judiciary. On the other hand, I suppose that "the ideal of the rule of law" was more in
keeping with Frankfurter's jurisprudence than Black's.

